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The war metaphor  
Around the world, responses to the COVID-19 pandemic differ. Yet one element that 
many states – from their politicians and policymakers to journalists, healthcare 
specialists, and much of the public at large – seem to have in common is in framing 
and referring to the pandemic as a ‘war’. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the 
United States. On 17th March 2020, US President Donald Trump tweeted: ‘the world 
is at war with a hidden enemy. WE WILL WIN!’. In a press conference the following 
day on his decision to invoke the Defense Production Act in response to the crisis, 
Trump said: 
 
the invisible enemy, it’s always the toughest enemy, the invisible enemy, but we are 
going to defeat the invisible enemy, I think we’re gonna do it even faster than we 
thought and it will be a complete victory, a total victory…  
 
Trump further stated that the US is ‘at war against the Chinese virus’, which ‘spreads 
violently’, while also completely refuting suggestions that using the term ‘Chinese virus’ 
is racist and puts Asian-Americans at risk. Asked if he considers the United States to 
be in a ‘war-time footing’ in terms of fighting the virus, he answered (seemingly 
forgetting that he is already a wartime president, with the U.S. continuing its ‘war on 
terror’ in numerous countries):  
 
I do, I actually do, I’m looking at it that way … I view it as a … in a sense a wartime 
president, I mean that’s what we’re fighting … one day you have to close it down [the 
economy] in order to defeat this enemy.  
 
The Atlantic Council, in a piece which draws parallels between the events of 9/11 and 
the pandemic, urges Trump to invoke Article 5 of the NATO Treaty, an article which 





triggers collective self-defence among NATO’s members if one of them is subject to 
an armed attack. Trump could, writes Frederick Kempe (President and CEO of the 
Atlantic Council), ‘offer the transatlantic community an Article 5 declaration of war 
against this deadly pathogen’, as ‘there is far greater need now than after 9/11 for a 
symbolic gesture of unity.’ Kempe also refers to the virus as the ‘Chinese-originated 
COVID-19’, and his piece is, unsurprisingly, rather more concerned about maintaining 
US primacy over China in relations with Europe than it is about effective responses 
to the pandemic.  In an op-ed in the New York Times, David Katz draws a parallel 
between ‘two kinds of military action: inevitable and collateral damage of diffuse 
hostilities, and the precision of a “surgical strike,” methodically targeted to the sources 
of our particular peril’, and the ‘battle’ against the coronavirus pandemic, calling on 
the United States and the world to ‘consider the surgical approach, while there is still 
time.’ 
 
This invocation of war in discussions and statements on the coronavirus pandemic is 
not limited to the US. In his address to the nation on the 16th March, French President 
Emmanuel Macron told the country ‘nous sommes en guerre’ – ‘we are at war’ – 
against an invisible enemy. In Britain, Prime Minister Boris Johnson argued that his 
government ‘must act like any wartime government’, announced the setting-up of a 
‘war room’, and said he and his cabinet ministers had a ‘battle plan’. Israel now finds 
itself in another ‘state of war’, according to Moshe Bar Siman-Tov, director general of 
the health ministry. In Australia, Prime Minister Scott Morrison called on Australians 
to ‘summon the spirit of the Anzacs … Of those who won the great peace of World 
War II and defended Australia.’ As such, while this piece focuses primarily on US 
policy, it is relevant beyond.  
 
The use of the war metaphor and the language of violence and conflict is neither 
accurate nor helpful for the situation we are facing. For one thing, those drawing 
parallels between this pandemic and war fail to recognise the role of war in spreading 
disease, and in causing public health crises. The relationship between war and disease 
is not benign, and it is certainly not positive – war does not cure or cleanse. In reality, 
war and infectious disease are ‘deadly comrades’, and ‘infectious diseases ruthlessly 
exploit the conditions created by war, affecting both armies and civilians.’ Hagopian 
contends that war itself should be viewed as a public health problem, given that it is 
‘arguably at the root of most of the world’s violent deaths … and significant numbers 
of chronic, infectious, and psychological health problems’ and ‘generates round after 
round of refugee movements, mental health crises, infectious epidemics, and chronic 





ailments.’1 In Afghanistan, for example, the Costs of War project notes that ‘nearly 
every factor associated with premature death – poverty, malnutrition, poor sanitation, 
lack of access to health care, environmental degradation – is exacerbated by the current 
war.’ This is, of course, not a new problem. War and the spread of disease have always 
been related – they were the combined agents of European genocides of Indigenous 
populations throughout the Americas, and were often intertwined with colonialism. 
For example, writing on the relationship between cholera epidemics and colonialism 
in India, David Arnold noted that: ‘It has become so customary to apply military 
metaphors to epidemic diseases to speak of their “attacks” and “invasions,” of the 
“devastation” they cause or the “resistance” they encounter, and of their “conquest” 
by medical science, that one could easily overlook the literal correspondence between 
cholera and military power in colonial India.’2 
 
Why, then, does the war metaphor hold such appeal? Steinart argues that the war 
metaphor is ‘strong and socially valid because it is connected to very basic social values 
and their everyday practices: community, patriarchy, masculinity.’3 I would add that, 
for Western states in particular – and for some states more than others – the war 
metaphor is ‘strong and socially valid’ because it is connected to everyday practices of 
imperialism. This is especially true in the United States. After all, the US is ‘a nation 
deeply wedded to and defined by war, though maddeningly reluctant to admit it’.4 The 
experience of the ‘war’ on drugs in the US is one illustration of this. Apart from 
wreaking havoc on communities across the US itself – especially among African-
American communities – and driving up dramatically the US prison population, this 
heavily militarised approach to drug control has had serious and far-reaching effects 
across Latin America. The ‘war’ on terror is another example of the US obsession with 
militarised responses to all kinds of threats. In pursuing it, the US conducts ‘counter-
terror’ operations in more than 80 countries, which has led to more than $2 trillion in 
war-related debt, and at least 801,000 deaths directly due to war violence.5 That we 
should reach for the language of war and conflict in responding to this pandemic is 
troubling, and demonstrative of how the past nineteen years in particular, since the 
advent of the global ‘war on terror’, have shaped our thinking and our responses. As 
Steinert notes, ‘metaphors have consequences’.6 For example, Hartmann-Mahmud 
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finds that declaring a ‘war’ in such instances often leads to ‘a curbing of critical 
discourse on the issues, because to be anti-war is perceived to be unpatriotic, even 
treasonous.’7 Such declarations of war ‘in general … delays or precludes the pursuit of 
effective solutions to glaring problems facing the international community, and the 
United States more specifically.’8   
 
Sanctions as imperialism  
Despite the societal devastation the coronavirus pandemic is wreaking in the US and 
across the globe, US imperialism continues apace. As Chimni has noted, ‘global 
imperialism is characterized by the displacement of violence to the third world.’9 Such 
violence, indeed, continues in the time of COVID-19. US sanctions on Iran are a prime 
example of this. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) found in 2018 that US 
restrictions: 
 
on the importation and purchase of goods required for humanitarian needs, such as 
foodstuffs and medicines, including life-saving medicines, treatment for chronic disease 
or preventive care, and medical equipment may have a serious detrimental impact on 
the health and lives of individuals on the territory of Iran.10 
 
The COVID-19 pandemic has been disastrous for Iran. Seyed Abbas Mousavi, Iran’s 
Foreign Ministry spokesperson, has described US sanctions at this time as ‘medical 
terrorism’. Yet, on the 17th March, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo imposed fresh 
sanctions on Iran, stating that ‘the Wuhan virus is a killer and the Iranian regime is an 
accomplice’. On the 21st March, President Trump and Secretary Pompeo confirmed 
that the US would not offer sanctions relief to Iran.  
 
As is noted in The Lancet by Takian, Raoofi and Kazempour-Ardebili, ‘since May 2019, 
the unilateral sanctions imposed by the USA against Iran have increased dramatically 
to an almost total economic lockdown.’ Sanctions are violent. The authors of The 
Lancet piece (all Iranian medical professionals) recognise this, arguing that although 
sanctions do not ‘seem to be physical warfare weapons’: 
 
… they are just as deadly, if not more so. Jeopardising the health of populations for 
political ends is not only illegal but also barbaric … The global health community should 
regard these sanctions as war crimes and seek accountability for those who impose them.  
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While Pompeo maintains that humanitarian assistance to Iran is ‘wide open’ and ‘not 
sanctioned’, it is important to note that ‘U.S. secondary sanctions have restricted 
humanitarian trade with Iran by scaring off most banks from facilitating the necessary 
payments.’ However, unilateral sanctions of the kind imposed by the US on Iran are 
not strictly unlawful under international law: ‘economic coercion is prima facie legal; the 
issue of legality will depend on the rules that apply in a given situation.’11 In its 
Nicaragua judgment, the ICJ was less than strict when it came to economic coercion 
and finding whether such coercion amounted to illegal intervention. As Hofer notes, 
‘the Court did not discuss the threshold that needs to be met in order for economic 
pressure to be considered coercive and was quite restrictive when it came to applying 
the principle of non-intervention to such acts’, stating that it was ‘unable to regard 
such action on the economic plane as is here complained of as a breach of the 
customary-law principle of non-intervention.’12 In fact, the bar for what constitutes 
illegal intervention in terms of economic sanctions is ‘set so high that it seems near 
impossible to reach.’13  
 
Like much in public international law, the legality of the economic coercive measures 
applied by the US to Iran is hazy. As such, in the first instance, it is not entirely accurate 
to say that US sanctions on Iran do not comply with international law, however 
dubious the US intentions are, and however illegitimate the claims that these sanctions 
are in service to its national security. Whether US sanctions, particularly in light of the 
COVID-19 pandemic, are unlawful under international humanitarian law and 
international human rights law is another discussion. Even prior to the pandemic, the 
United States’ coercive measures against Iran had ‘made the basics of life, including 
food and medicine, prohibitively expensive, particularly for the poor’ and had a drastic 
impact on healthcare in the country. Idriss Jazairy, the former UN Special Rapporteur 
on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures on the enjoyment of human 
rights, found in 2018 that US measures against Iran constitute economic warfare, and 
argued that ‘this form of warfare that relies on starvation and disease deserves the same 
concern from the international community as any other conflict.’ Yet if human rights 
obligations were to apply here, the US itself refuses to recognise the extraterritorial 
application of human rights law.14  
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This desperate situation highlights how the indeterminacy of international law and its 
interpretation by powerful states (particularly those in the Global North) often 
facilitates, rather than hinders, measures such as the US sanctions on Iran. As Hofer 
illustrates, ‘developed States – such as the US and EU Member States – justify 
economic coercion as, among other things, a legitimate means to achieve foreign policy 
objectives and enforce community norms.’15 These sanctions, which are essentially a 
foreign policy weapon, cannot be construed as anything other than a powerful state 
imposing its will and its weight on a weaker state, and terrorising its civilian 
population.16 This should serve as another reminder that questioning the legality or 
otherwise of such conduct, and nothing more, is simply not enough – something worth 
keeping in mind as we watch governments around the world proclaim the legality of 
their responses to this pandemic.  
 
Meanwhile US uses of physical force carry on too.  For instance, airstrikes on Somalia 
continue ‘at blistering pace’. One such strike recently killed a 70-year old man and a 
13-year old boy.  It is notable that these strikes in Somalia, which have killed far more 
innocent people than just the two mentioned above, are described as ‘precision 
airstrikes’ by US Africa Command. This is the same ‘surgical approach’ which Katz, in 
his aforementioned New York Times piece, implores the US and the world to take 
against the coronavirus. The idea of ‘precision’ warfare has, particularly in this era of 
drone strikes and ‘remote’ warfare, always been a misnomer. ‘Surgical’, ‘precision’ 
warfare has wreaked untold death and destruction upon thousands of people in 
numerous countries.  In light of this, the idea that the coronavirus pandemic is a ‘war’ 
is, at the very least, extremely distasteful.  
 
Make solidarity, not war  
Combined with this language of war, and its accompanying tools, the use of terms 
such as ‘Chinese virus’ and ‘Wuhan virus’, alongside Trump’s exhortation regarding 
the pandemic (‘this is why we need borders!’) demonstrates the potential for far-
reaching racist intimidation and violence, and greater anti-immigration measures not 
only in the US but across the globe. The possibility of nationalist, militarised responses 
to what is a worldwide medical emergency, with severe repercussions for many of us, 
looms large. Writing on US economic measures in response to this crisis, Barker 
observes that planning should be motivated by ‘solidarity and compassion’, and not by 
‘defense against shadowy enemies.’ This is a message that applies in all aspects of our 
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response to this pandemic. Chimni writes that ‘[t]he final form of global alienation is 
the alienation of humans from fellow humans. We live in a world that is increasingly 
devoid of sentiments of solidarity with the deprived and oppressed, especially with 
distant Others.’17 Many of us may be experiencing alienation through social distancing 
(albeit of a less traumatic kind than that experienced by those fleeing or living under 
war, while now also suffering through a pandemic), and understand that this alienation 
can be mitigated through solidarity, through gestures big and small. Let us not now 
forget to express that same solidarity with those who were already suffering under 
violent capitalist imperialism – under sanctions, under military warfare, and more – as 
we are expressing for our own communities and those around the world who are 
suffering due to this pandemic. 
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